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Justice Rehnquist once said that there may be cases "in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invok-
ing judicial process to obtain a conviction." ' The conduct of law
enforcement in the case of Humberto Alvarez-Machain apparently
was not sufficiently outrageous.
As a result of an indictment for crimes in connection with the
kidnapping and murder of a United States Drug Agent, individuals
acting at the request of the Drug Enforcement Administration forci-
bly kidnaped Alvarez-Machain from his office in Mexico and flew
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. The initial impetus for this arti-
cle came from a talk delivered by Mark Griffin, a visiting scholar at Boston College Law
School in the spring of 1993, on the exclusionary/abuse of process doctrine in Australia.
Mark is a graduate of the University of Adelaide Law School and has been practicing
criminal law since 1979 in South Australia. In addition to his talk, Mark provided me
with much research and information with regard to Australia and New Zealand cases.
Without his help this article could not have been written.
Many colleagues provided helpful ideas. I wish to thank in particular Arthur Ber-
ney, Mark Brodin, Phyllis Goldfarb, Judy McMorrow, Robert Smith and Aviam Soifer. I
also wish to thank my research assistant, Barbara Helm, a second-year student at Boston
College Law School. Finally, I wish to thank my wife Christina Jameson for her usual
superb editing.
I United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); but see United States v. Alva-
rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (asserting that the unlawfulness of an arrest in the
federal system has never affected the court's jurisdiction to proceed with a criminal
case). This principle is regarded as the Ker/Frisbie rule from Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Although a possible exception to this
rule was suggested in United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1974),
where the action by a United States government agent shocked the conscience, no fed-
eral court has ever found this level of conduct sufficient to dismiss jurisdiction over the
defendant. See Matta Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990). See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
220-39 (2d ed. 1987).
462
JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
him by private plane to Texas where D.E.A. agents arrested him. 2
He argued at his trial in the United States District Court that the
indictment ought to be dismissed due to outrageous governmental
conduct and the fact that his abduction violated the Extradition
Treaty between the United States and Mexico. The district court
and court of appeals dismissed the case on the grounds that the kid-
napping violated the Extradition Treaty.3 In its reversal of these de-
cisions, the Supreme Court held that the treaty had not been
violated.4 Hence, none of the courts hearing Alvarez-Machain ac-
cepted or reached the argument that outrageous governmental con-
duct by itself should deny a court jurisdiction over this defendant.
A different approach to these facts might be found in a case
which occurred in New Zealand, where a man named Bennett was
charged with murder.5 He claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction
because he was illegally brought back to New Zealand from Austra-
lia. Apparently the New Zealand police did not have a warrant for
Bennett's extradition and merely asked the Melbourne police over
the telephone to put him on a plane destined for New Zealand.6
The Melbourne police complied with the request by removing Ben-
nett from his bed and putting him on the next flight to New Zealand,
where he was met at the airport by New Zealand authorities. 7 This
conduct was arguably less outrageous than the conduct in Alvarez-
Machain. However, the Court of Appeal in New Zealand indicated in
dicta that had the issue been properly raised at trial, the trial judge
would have been justified in discharging the defendant.,
Are the courts to rely on the Executive to protect their process from
abuse? Have they not themselves an inescapable duty to secure fair
treatment for those who come or are brought before them? To ques-
tions of this sort there is only one possible answer. The courts cannot
contemplate for a moment the transference to the Executive of the
2 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 431-32.
S United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aft'd sub nom.,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992). In dealing with the issue of outrageous conduct, the district court judge indi-
cated that no case departed from the rule in Ker, which held that the jurisdiction of the
court to try a criminal defendant is not impaired by the method by which he is brought
to the court's jurisdiction. Although there might be an exception to this rule when the
conduct is so outrageous that it shocks the conscience, the conduct did not meet that
standard. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 605-06.
4 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
5 See Regina v. Hartley, 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (C.A. 1977).
6 See id. at 214 (a warrant was required for lawful extradition).
7 Id
8 Id. at 217.
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responsibility for seeing that the process of law is not abused.9
These two cases graphically demonstrate different approaches
to the problem of governmental conduct that is illegal or otherwise
offensive. The New Zealand court could not tolerate this type of
conduct. The United States federal courts ultimately could tolerate
it. This difference highlights the importance of the concept ofjudi-
cial integrity.
The concept ofjudicial integrity may be described as the role of
the judiciary in leading by example. A court can invalidate or rectify
certain kinds of offensive official action on the grounds of judicial
integrity. In this way, judges act as a beacon or a symbol to society
for ensuring lawful acts by the forces of government. Thus, a court
is wise to be cognizant of how its actions will affect the public per-
ception of the judicial system. A court may not sanction or partici-
pate in illegal or unfair acts. There are two underlying goals of
judicial integrity. First, on a public relations level, the court wishes
to be regarded as a symbol of lawfulness and justice. Second, the
court has the closely related concern of not appearing to be allied
with bad acts. Stated differently, the judge does not want to appear
to be associated with illegal actors. 10
Our ancestors were sensitive to possible abuses of power by the
executive and created three branches of government in part to insu-
late the court system from the evils they perceived in the English
system-a system in which the monarchy could utilize the courts for
its own design.
[T]he highest compliment that has ever been paid to the American
bench, is embodied in this simple fact, that if the executive officers of
this government have ever desired to take away the life or the liberty of
a citizen contrary to law, they have not come into the courts to get it
done, they have gone outside of the courts, and stepped over the Con-
stitution, and created their own tribunals."
The concept of checks and balances is closely tied to the indepen-
dence and integrity of the judiciary. 12
9 Id. at 216 (quoting Lord Devlin's remarks in Connelly v. Director of Pub. Prosecu-
tions, 1964 App. Cas. 1354 (H.L.)).
10 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-60 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
II Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 65 (1866).
12 "The principle of 'checks and balances' embodies the notion that power can be
checked only if it is shared; each branch has the right, if not the affirmative duty, to curb
the excesses of the others." Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the
Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427, 443-44 (1982). "[A]rticle III
serves as an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances by
preserving the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system of government."
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The Federalist Papers13 expressed the importance of protecting
the independence of the judiciary so that it can perform its impor-
tant function of ensuring that the other branches do not overstep
their bounds. "The complete independence of the courts of justice
is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution."' 14 The symbolic
function of the judiciary as a safeguard for a society of laws was also
stressed.
The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have al-
ready been felt in more states than one; and though they may have
displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disap-
pointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all
the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men of every description
ought to prize whatever will tend to beget and fortify that temper in
the courts; as no man can be sure that he'may not be a gainer to-day.
And every man must now feel that the inevitable tendency of such a
spirit is to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to
introduce in its stead, universal distrust and distress.' 5
A leading exposition of the concept of judicial integrity can be
found in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States.16 The Government in that case used illegal wiretaps to secure
evidence of criminal activity. The majority did not find this activity
to be violative of the Fourth Amendment and allowed the evidence
to be introduced. Brandeis asked rhetorically, "will this Court by
sustaining the judgment below sanction such conduct on the part of
the Executive?"' 17 Brandeis answered his own question as follows:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imper-
iled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2676 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)).
13 Briefly, the Federalists were proponents of the Constitution, whereas the Antifed-
eralists were wary of a strong national government and wanted direct government by the
people at the local level. The Antifederalists did not like the idea of a federal judicial
branch of government because they viewed this as another source of danger to individ-
ual liberty and to the autonomy of the states. In order to combat these fears of the
Antifederalists, the Federalists wrote the Federalist Papers. Although the role of the
Federalist Papers in the construction of the Constitution was to persuade the ambiva-
lent, they are still often consulted as a way to understand the theory underlying the
Constitution. They are among the classic works in the theory of democracy and the
Constitution. See Federalists and Antifederalists, in 1 CONSTrrUTIONAL HERITAGE SERIES 120-
21 (John P. Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONsTrrTIONAL LAw 7 (2d ed. 1991).
14 Limitation refers to power of the legislative authority. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
15 Id. at 528-29.
16 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17 I& at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to de-
clare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face. 18
Brandeis' major concern was not the right of the individual de-
fendants; rather, he stressed the symbolic protection of the entire
government through preservation of "the purity of its courts."' 9
This Article will focus on the federal criminal justice system
through an examination of decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. In earlier times, the Supreme Court was more willing to util-
ize notions of judicial integrity to constrain individuals who act
under official license. One finds the concept ofjudicial integrity be-
ing used initially to justify the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
remedy,20 to sanction the Court's use of supervisory powers, 2 1 and,
to a lesser extent, to justify the application of due process.2 2 The
majority of the current Supreme Court, however, has retreated from
the use of the doctrine of judicial integrity, such that judicial integ-
rity is no longer regarded as a justification for the exclusionary
rule.23 In addition, the viability of the judicial integrity doctrine has
deteriorated as the Court has limited the use of its supervisory pow-
ers. 24 Moreover, there is substantially less flexibility inherent in due
process, especially for the investigative stage of the criminal pro-
cess, due to the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
By way of contrast, examples from Australia and New Zealand 25
18 Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20 Courts may exclude evidence found as a result of illegal police activity. This "ex-
clusionary rule" was first ennunciated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914).
21 Supervisory powers allow the Court to implement some sort of remedy for activity
that it finds offensive. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 744 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
22 Judicial integrity as a due process concept was developed in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Court refused to sanction "conduct that shocks the con-
science." Id. at 172.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1973) (the rule's primary
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct); United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976) (same).
24 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
25 Although it is certainly not clear that the ultimate result in Australia and New Zea-
land of exclusion or other remedies for bad acts by the executive will differ that signifi-
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will be utilized to demonstrate that the doctrine ofjudicial integrity
has re-emerged and gained force in these countries as illustrated in
the language of their courts which, ironically, sometimes cite United
States Supreme Court decisions. Finally, this Article will argue that
the pendulum has swung too far toward neglecting concerns inher-
ent in the principles of judicial integrity, and that the doctrine of
judicial integrity must be restored in the United States.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Concerns for the idea of judicial integrity played a large role in
the development of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. As
this Article will demonstrate, more recent decisions have devalued
the importance ofjudicial integrity and have largely eliminated it as
ajustification for the rule. Two previously mentioned and intercon-
nected concerns with the concept of judicial integrity can be found
by looking at the roots of the exclusionary rule. First, the Court
should be a symbol to the public as the guarantor of the rights pro-
vided by our laws. Second, the Court should not participate in the
sanctioning of illegal acts.
In the early case of Weeks v. United States,26 which barred the use
of evidence in federal prosecution if obtained by federal officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court indicated the sym-
bolic importance of failing to sanction government misdeeds. "The
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the courts to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures .. .should find no
sanction in the judgment of the courts. ' '27
In Elkins v. United States,28 the Court went on to suppress evi-
dence illegally obtained by a state officer when the prosecution
sought to introduce the evidence at a federal criminal trial.2 9 This
practice is known as the "silver platter" doctrine because a state offi-
cial delivered illegally obtained evidence, on a so-called silver plat-
ter, for a federal prosecution and thereby avoided the exclusion
remedy which, prior to Elkins, only barred evidence obtained by fed-
eral officials.30 In Elkins, the Court spoke of "the imperative ofjudi-
cial integrity" and decried a situation in which the judge was in any
candy from the United States, the Australian and New Zealand courts at least consider
judicial integrity in their analyses whereas the United States does not.
26 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27 Id at 392.
28 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
29 Id at 223.
30 Id. at 208.
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way a participant in the willful disobedience of the law.3' To sup-
port this position, the Court cited the dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes in Olmstead v. United States for the proposition that the gov-
ernment was still the same government whether it was acting as a
prosecutor or as a judge.
3 2
With Weeks and Elkins as precedent, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio 
3 3
applied the exclusionary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations
to state prosecutions. Mapp reiterated the language about judicial
integrity in Elkins and in Weeks to support its holding.
But as was said in Elkins, 'there is another consideration-the impera-
tive of judicial integrity.' The criminal goes free if he must, but it is
the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence.
3 4
The majority in Mapp concluded:
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled
and to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true admin-
istration of justice.a
5
In addition to judicial integrity, the Court relied on deterrence
as a seperate and distinct justification for the exclusionary rule. The
Mapp Court, quoting Elkins, stated that, "only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to de-
ter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.' "36
The judicial integrity justification for the exclusionary rule was
short-lived. In Linkletter v. Walker,3 7 decided a mere four years after
Mapp, the Court refused to give retroactive effect to cases decided
prior to Mapp. The Court announced the prime justification for
Mapp to be that the exclusionary rule was the only effective way to
31 Id. at 222.
32 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34 Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
35 Id. at 660.
36 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
37 381 U.S. 618 (1965). It should be pointed out that we are limiting our analysis to
Supreme Court decisions. As the Supreme Court has retreated from the exclusionary
rule, there has been a movement in some states through the interpretation of their own
constitutions to maintain the exclusionary rule as well as the concept of judicial integ-
rity. See Daniel P. O'Brien, Recent Decision, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 733 (1992); Robert F. Utter,
State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability, 64
WASH. L. REV. 19 (1989).
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deter lawless police action.38 Because the misconduct had already
occurred and would not be corrected by releasing the prisoners, the
Court refused to apply Mapp retroactively. To the extent that the
Court bothered to mention judicial integrity, it did so only in the
context of the administrative nightmare that would occur if there
were to be a rehearing on the exclusion of evidence when the evi-
dence no longer existed and when witnesses were no longer
available.39
Subsequent decisions further demonstrated that the Supreme
Court discounted judicial integrity as a viable justification for the
exclusionary rule. In United States v. Calandra,40 for example, the
Court explicitly stated "the rule's prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct." 4 1 Significantly, Justice Brennan's dissent
classified this explanation of the exclusionary rule as a "downgrad-
ing" of the rule and as inconsistent with the intent of the Framers of
the Constitution.42 He pointed out that, in adopting the Fourth
Amendment, the Framers sought to curtail the government from
evil conduct, and it followed, Justice Brennan said, that the Framers
recognized the need for an enforcement mechanism. 43 This mecha-
nism had to be "capable of administration by judges."'44 This led
him to articulate the dual purposes of the concept of judicial integ-
rity discussed above. He viewed these goals as "uppermost in the
minds of the framers," namely, to have the Court serve as a symbol
to maintain fundamental rights45 and to avoid any complicity in ille-
gal government conduct.
4 6
38 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637.
39 Id.
40 414 U.S. 338 (1973) (involving the applicability of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule at grand jury proceedings).
41 Id at 347.
42 Id at 355-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44 Id at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 391-92, 394 (1914) and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)).
46 Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan continued:
For the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital
function of the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slightest appearance
of sanctioning illegal governmental conduct. This rejection of 'the imperative of
judicial integrity,' openly invites '[t]he conviction that all government is staffed by
... hypocrites, [a conviction] easy to instill and difficult to erase.' When judges
appear to become 'accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are
sworn to uphold,' we imperil the very foundation of our people's trust in their Gov-
ernment on which our democracy rests.
Id (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960)). See also Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by
the Police, 52J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 255, 258 (1961).
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The next step in the demise ofjudicial integrity was to redefine
it. In United States v. Janis,47 the Court refused to apply the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule to civil proceedings and lumped judi-
cial integrity concerns with the deterrent rationale. The Court justi-
fied this approach by characterizing judicial integrity in the
following limited fashion: "the courts must not commit or en-
courage violations." 48 Because violations already had occurred,
there could be no encouragement at the time the evidence was
presented to the Court.
Even more forceful criticism of judicial integrity as a justifica-
tion for the exclusionary rule appeared in Stone v. Powell.49 The Stone
Court pointed out that if one were to extend the rationale ofjudicial
integrity to its logical conclusion, the court would have to exclude
anything illegally obtained even if the defendant did not object.50 If
one were concerned with preventing illegality, why should there be
a "standing" restriction on the exclusionary rule?51 Justice Powell,
speaking for the majority, pointed out another way to approach the
symbolic or public perception aspect of judicial integrity. Not only
could one view judicial integrity as a means to prevent illegality; one
also could look at it as a means to prevent the truth from being
served (by excluding reliable evidence) with the result of freeing a
guilty person.52 "While courts, of course, must ever be concerned
with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this concern has
limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative
evidence." 53
The final step in the Court's retreat from utilizing judicial integ-
rity as a justification for the exclusionary rule can be found in United
States v. Leon. 54 For the first time, the Court refused to exclude evi-
dence in the prosecution's case in chief obtained by police who ac-
ted in good faith.55 Following the lead ofJanis, the majority merged
47 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
48 Id. at 458 n.35.
49 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
50 Id. at 485.
51 Id. at 485. As the Court pointed out, the concern for preventing illegality would
affect the standing requirement developed in Aldeman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969), as well as the Ker/Frisbie requirement. In addition, the Court noted that the
exclusionary rule was applicable for impeachment purposes, Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62 (1954), or in grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
52 Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
53 Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
54 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
55 Id. at 900-05. Officers obtained a search warrant which was later found to be lack-
ing probable cause. Id.
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the deterrence and judicial integrity concerns and reasoned that,
when there was no deterrent effect, there was not really any judicial
participation. Thus, the integrity of the Court was not offended.
5 6
The Court also redefined the symbolic effect associated with judicial
integrity. It asserted that if probative evidence is excluded and
thereby a guilty defendant goes free, especially when the police vio-
lation is minor or not deliberate, this use of exclusion may well
"generate disrespect for the law and administration ofjustice."5 7
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens expressed frustration
over the diminution of the power asserted by the Court.
Today for the first time,58 the Court holds that although the Constitu-
tion has been violated, no Court should do anything about it at any
time and in any proceeding .... Courts simply cannot escape their
responsibility for redressing constitutional violations if they admit evi-
dence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures .... If
such evidence is admitted, then the Court becomes not merely the fi-
nal and necessary link in an unconstitutional claim of evidence but its
actual motivating force.59
In sum, use of the judicial integrity concept to support the ex-
clusionary rule has, as of the present day, been totally discounted
and supplanted entirely by the deterrence rationale. It has been
recharacterized from a proposition that courts should act as a sym-
bol for lawful conduct to a concern that the courts should not be-
come a symbol for guilty people going free as the result of
suppression of probative evidence.
III. SUPERVISORY POWERS
The use of supervisory powers is a way in which the federal
courts can monitor the administration of criminal justice in the fed-
eral courts themselves without reliance on constitutional or statu-
tory authority. The justification for the use of these powers appears
to be closely tied to the idea of judicial integrity. A majority of the
current Court has decreased the opportunities for federal courts to
use supervisory powers and has thereby demonstrated its dis-
enchantment with the concept of judicial integrity.
To date, the federal courts have utilized supervisory powers in
two general contexts. First, these powers have been used to exclude
evidence obtained in connection with a bad act by law enforcement
56 Id. at 921 n.22 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976)).
57 Id. at 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)).
58 Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The reference to "first time" was to the disal-
lowance of the exclusionary rule during the prosecution's case in chief even though
there had been a violation.
59 Id. at 977-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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officials. 60 Such conduct is regarded as having occurred outside the
court system. This judicial practice is not dissimilar to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule.6 1 The federal courts have also uti-
lized their supervisory powers to ensure that proper procedures are
utilized by the court system. The conduct examined in the latter
type of cases is that which has occurred within the court system.62
McNabb v. United States,63 which dealt with the action of a police
official, is generally regarded as the first decision to invoke supervi-
sory powers. In McNabb, federal officers obtained statements by in-
terrogating defendants during a detention in violation of a statute
that required an arrested individual to be brought immediately
before a magistrate.64 Since Congress did not provide a remedy for
violation of the statute, the Supreme Court determined that it had
the inherent power to exclude the evidence. 65 The Court avoided
the constitutional issue that Congress had not explicitly forbidden
the use of evidence procured in violation of the statute by simply
indicating that it had power to review action occurring within the
federal court system.66 "Judicial supervision of the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establish-
ing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence." 67 In formulating this approach, the Court was somewhat
vague as to the source of the power. The Court did refer to its flexi-
ble power to formulate rules of evidence. "[I]n formulating such
rules of evidence for federal criminal trials the Court has been
guided by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons
60 See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
61 It is interesting to note that the exclusionary rule and the supervisory powers of
the court have had the parallel rationales of deterrence and judicial integrity. Justice
Marshall, speaking of supervisory powers in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting), said, "[t]he rationale for such suppression of evidence
is twofold: to deter illegal conduct by government officials, and to protect the integrity
of the federal courts." Supervisory powers have generally been utilized when there have
been deliberate improper acts by government officials; otherwise the court "places its
imprimatur upon such lawlessness and thereby taints its own integrity." Id. at 746 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992) (prosecutor failed to
present exculpatory evidence to grand jury); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487
U.S. 250 (1988) (prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceeding); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (exclusion of women from the jury pool).
63 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
64 The defendants were put into a barren cell and kept there for 14 hours instead of
being brought before the magistrate. They were subjected to constant questioning by
several officers for two days. One confession was obtained by unlawful detention and
questioning for five or six consecutive hours. Id. at 345.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 340.
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of evidentiary relevance." 68
Yet the justification for the McNabb decision appears to be simi-
lar to Brandeis' formulation in Olmstead, namely, that the courts
should not participate in the wrongdoing by law enforcement and
that the courts ought to be monitors of justice.
We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far
as courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement. We
hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of
justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted
upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed here.69
In subsequent supervisory cases the Court elaborated upon notions
of judicial integrity that appeared in McNabb. In Elkins, which uti-
lized supervisory power to eliminate the previously mentioned silver
platter doctrine, judicial integrity was an important consideration.
This basic principle was accepted by the Court in McNabb v. United
States. There it was held that "a conviction resting on evidence se-
cured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Con-
gress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without the courts
themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of the law."
70
The close relationship between judicial integrity and supervi-
sory powers can be found in cases which have sought to ensure
proper court procedure. In Ballard v. United States,71 the Court dealt
with the issue of systematic and intentional exclusion of women
from the jury pool. 72 The Court refused to consider whether this
exclusion would affect an individual case but did look at the injury to
the judicial system and social community. "The injury is not limited
to the defendant-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an
institution, to the community at large and to the democratic ideal
reflected in the processes of our Courts."73 With this language, the
68 Id. at 341.
69 Id. at 347. See also James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule:
Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1 (1958):
The court is charged with the solemn duty of maintaining the machinery ofjustice
free from corrosive influences-influences which will become apparent only when it
is much too late to do much about them. The admission into evidence during the
course of a federal criminal prosecution of the "fruits of wrongdoing by the police"
propagating as it does the vicious doctrine that the end justifies the means, can only
serve to cheapen the entire criminal proceeding.
Id. at 30-31 (quoting Upshaw v. United States, 333 U.S. 410, 413 (1948)).
70 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (quoting McNabb, 318 U.S. at
345).
71 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
72 It should be pointed out that this case was decided prior to the equal protection
analysis adopted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
73 Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195. See also Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1657 (1963) ("So long as the 'error' violates the court's standards
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Court was striving to maintain the judiciary as a symbol for the rest
of society as a just institution with high ideals.
Whether designed to do justice in a particular fact situation or to es-
tablish general standards, these supervisory-power decisions reflect
concern about the degree of fairness in the judicial process. The
courts' increased activity in this field well may emanate, at least in part,
from the availability of a named doctrine on which to ground deci-
sions, and from the new-found freedom to ignore whether particular
litigants were harmed by the asserted error.74
Even though there has not been a clear formulation of the ra-
tionale behind cases involving supervisory powers, 75 such powers
have been utilized to decide a large number of cases. 76
In analyzing the most recent of such cases, one finds that the
for conducting judicial proceedings, reversal will usually follow even though the effect
on the particular litigant may have been inconsequential or nonexistent.").
74 The Supervisory Power, supra note 73, at 1659.
75 See Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CoLuM. L. REV. 1433 (1984) (Profes-
sor Beale argues forcefully and convincingly that there actually is no legal basis for the
use of supervisory powers). See also George E. Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in
Criminal Procedure, 27 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 53 (1989):
Commentators have been unable to justify satisfactorily the Court's action in these
cases. Defense of the Court was probably most honestly and effectively provided by
one who offered that regardless of the absence of an "identifiable source" for the
power, it is afait accompli "and deserves to be judged on its merits rather than its
ancestry." Convinced that federal criminal justice needed a flexible judicial doc-
trine permitting the courts to remedy wrongs not specifically anticipated by legisla-
tion and constitutional provisions, he found development of the supervisory power
"beneficial."
Id. at 84 (quoting Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L.J.
1050, 1077-78 (1965); citing The Supervisory Power, supra note 73, at 1656 (supervisory
power exclusionary decisions are appropriate exercise of court's legitimate function of
maintaining their own integrity, and impact upon police is incidental)).
76 See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171, 181 (1975); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954); Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.), afd on reh'g, 483 F.2d
1190 (9th Cir. 1973); Guam v. Camacho, 470 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th
Cir. 1971); In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v.Jones, 433 F.2d
1176 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971); Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d
782 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 942 (1972); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
837 (1969); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1017 (1970); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); United
States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Persisco v. United States,
395 U.S. 911 (1969); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1968); Pea v. United
States, 397 F.2d 627, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (rehearing en banc); ACF Indus., Inc. v.
Guinn, 384 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 949 (1968); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Lovell, 378 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1967); Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d
941 (5th Cir. 1966); Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States
v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir.
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present Supreme Court has dearly indicated that the use of supervi-
sory powers should be curtailed. The Court has refused to utilize
supervisory powers to expand on existing limitations to constitu-
tional power. The rationale for this approach has been the Court's
reluctance to suppress reliable evidence. 77 It should be pointed out
that this concern for the probative value of the evidence did not
exist in United States v. McNabb, where there was no indication that
the confession was involuntary and therefore unreliable. 78 Thus,
the confession in McNabb had considerable probative value.79
United States v. Payner80 is a case which illustrates the Court's
refusal to utilize supervisory powers even when the conduct by law
enforcement officials was outrageous, because to have done so
would have stretched beyond previously decided constitutional limi-
tations.81 In Payner, the IRS illegally broke into a banker's briefcase
and copied documents implicating the defendant. Because the de-
fendant did not have standing for Fourth Amendment purposes, the
district court utilized its supervisory powers to monitor police
power and suppressed a document found in the briefcase.8 2 In re-
jecting the exercise of supervisory powers in this instance, the
Supreme Court felt that the societal interest in allowing for the use
of probative evidence outweighed the importance of preserving ju-
dicial integrity.83 In addition, the Court was concerned about the
use of supervisory powers to circumvent the Fourth Amendment
1965); United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965); Ford v. United States, 352
F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (en banc).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
78 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 339.
79 Even the Warren Court seemed reluctant to utilize supervisory powers when to do
so might result in the exclusion of relevant evidence. In Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963), the Court refused to utilize supervisory powers to suppress a wire re-
cording which at that time did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court indicated
that where relevant competent evidence is sought to be introduced, supervisory powers
should be used sparingly. Id- at 440. It should be pointed out, however, that in this case
the Court did not find the conduct of the police to be manifestly improper.
80 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
81 Id. at 731-33 (the Court had developed various standing requirements which lim-
ited the availability of a Fourth Amendment violation claim).
82 Since the specific violation was directed at the bank official, the defendant was not
the direct victim of the Fourth Amendment infringement and therefore did not have
standing. He did not have an expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the banker's briefcase and
the documents contained therein. Without this expectation of privacy one cannot claim
a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 126 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
83 "In this case, where the illegal conduct did not violate the respondent's rights, the
interest in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such conduct is outweighed by
the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact." Payner, 447
U.S. at 736 n.8.
1993] 475
ROBERT M. BLOOM
standing requirements. These constitutional limitations had previ-
ously been created by the Supreme Court.8 4 In dissent, Justice Mar-
shall cited Brandeis' famous words in Olmstead,85 and pointed out
the grossness and the deliberateness of the government's miscon-
duct in the case and argued that the utilization of supervisory power
was required to protect the judicial integrity of the court.
8 6 "The
court," Justice Marshall reasoned, "should use its supervisory pow-
ers in federal criminal cases 'to see that the waters ofjustice are not
polluted.' "87
For improprieties occurring within the court system, the use of
supervisory powers has also been curtailed by the present Supreme
Court. As previously indicated, the Ballard decision was more con-
cerned with the symbolic importance of maintaining a just system
than in ensuring individual rights.8 8 In other words, the court was
concerned about the impact that a particular procedure would have
on the court system and sought to prevent any institutional harm.
This concern, however, is no longer predominant. The present
Court has tied the use of supervisory powers to the impact that its
utilization would have on a particular individual by instituting the
"harmless error" standard.8 9 In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,
90
the defendant sought to utilize the supervisory powers of the Court
to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct occurring
84 Id. at 731.
85 The famous words are:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the
law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If
the government becomes a lawbreaker; it breeds contempt for law; it invites every
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the admin-
istration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in
Payner, 447 U.S. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 Payner, 447 U.S. at 745 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485).
87 Id. at 744 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1,
14 (1956)).
88 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); see supra text accompanying notes
71-72.
89 Basically, a harmless error is one that does not affect a substantial right. If the
same verdict would have been reached with or without the error, then a harmless error
has occurred and the verdict can stand. This rule was developed in Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), where the Supreme Court held that a conviction need not be
overturned because of a constitutional error if no prejudice resulted from the mistake.
SeeJosHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 39-41 (1991).
90 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
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during a grand jury investigation. The Court refused to consider
the argument unless the defendant actually could demonstrate that
he had been prejudiced by the wrongful acts. In order for the Court
to utilize supervisory powers, the action had to meet the "harmless
error" standard.9 1 In quickly discounting the effect this might have
on judicial integrity, the Court stated, "[w]e also recognize that
where the error is harmless, concerns about the 'integrity of the Uu-
dicial] process' will carry less weight." 92
The above approach to limiting the use of supervisory power
had been criticized by Justice Brennan, who argued in an earlier dis-
senting opinion that an important public interest in preserving judi-
cial integrity exists and that it outweighs the upholding of the
conviction of a particular criminal defendant.
Admittedly, using the supervisory powers to reverse a conviction
under these circumstances appears to conflict with the public's interest
in upholding otherwise valid convictions that are tainted only by harm-
less error. But it is certainly arguable that the public's interests in pre-
serving judicial integrity and in insuring that Government prosecutors,
as its agents, refrain from intentionally violating defendants' rights are
stronger than its interest in upholding the conviction of a particular
criminal defendant. Convictions are important, but they should not be
protected at any cost.93
The most recent statement on supervisory powers by the Court
is found in United States v. Williams.94 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, suggested that there is not much leeway for the Court to util-
ize its supervisory powers, especially when doing so would create
rules not otherwise expressly provided for in the Constitution or by
Congress.9 5 In Williams, the defendant moved to dismiss an indict-
ment because the prosecution had failed to present exculpatory evi-
dence before the grand jury. The Tenth Circuit had instituted such
a disclosure rule pursuant to its supervisory powers.9 6 According to
Justice Scalia, grand jury procedures have historically enjoyed great
independence and consequently judges have generally been reluc-
tant to exercise supervisory powers over them. Justice Scalia sug-
gested that the only time supervisory powers would be appropriate
to dismiss an indictment would be when specific statutory provisions
exist, or when " 'clear rules ... [are] carefully drafted and approved
91 Id at 254. This standard is prescribed by FED. R. GRIM. P. 52(a).
92 Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 255 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
93 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 527 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
95 Id. at 1741.
96 See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987) (when exculpatory




by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand
jury's functions.' -7 This reasoning did not convince Justice Ste-
vens, who argued in dissent that the Court has an obligation to exer-
cise its supervisory powers to redress misconduct, even if the
misconduct was not specifically prohibited by a statute or by the
Constitution.
Unlike the Court, I am unwilling to hold that countless forms of
prosecutorial misconduct must be tolerated no matter how prejudicial
they may be, or how seriously they may distort the legitimate function
of the grand jury-simply because they are not proscribed by Rule 6 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a statute that is applicable
in grand jury proceedings. 98
Supervisory powers give judges considerable leeway within the
federal court system to rectify procedures or executive actions that
they find inherently wrong even though such procedures and ac-
tions may not violate constitutional or statutory provisions. This
leeway to do the right thing is closely tied to the concept ofjudicial
integrity. As just demonstrated, the Supreme Court has recently
shown an inclination to curtail sharply the use of supervisory pow-
ers. This decline in the use of supervisory powers appears to be
closely aligned with the Court's attitude toward the doctrine ofjudi-
cial integrity.
IV. DUE PROCESS
Due process, as found in the Fourteenth Amendment, presents
a somewhat ironic situation with regard to our discussion ofjudicial
integrity. Initially, the standard for the exercise of due process was
based on a somewhat amorphous standard of fundamental fairness.
Although this standard was consistent with the idea ofjudicial integ-
rity, judges rarely exercised their discretion to utilize it for a crimi-
nal defendant's prosecution.99 As various amendments became
incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, a
more restrictive standard ironically provided greater protection to
the defendant. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has cut
back on the substantive protections provided by the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments. 0 0 The restrictions on the use of due pro-
97 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74
(1986)).
98 Id. at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
100 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
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cess have negatively impacted on the principle of judicial integrity
and have reduced individual protection.
Most criminal prosecutions occur in the state judicial systems.
The first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights deal with the pro-
tections afforded to the individual against the central (federal) gov-
ernment. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, deals with
restrictions on the powers of the states. This amendment has be-
come the vehicle to curb the abuse of power by the states in criminal
matters. The initial standard for determining whether a particular
criminal proceeding violated due process' ° 1 under the Fourteenth
Amendment was left to the discretion of the judge, who determined
whether the proceeding offended notions of justice implicit in ca-
nons of decency and fairness.10 2 This approach allowed for a great
deal of discretion by the trial judge and implicitly allowed him or
her to exercise judicial integrity. One can see from Justice Frank-
furter's language in Rochin v. California 103 the important symbolic
role ofjudicial integrity discussed previously. "So here, to sanction
the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the
court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the
cloak of law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and
thereby to brutalize the temper of a society."' 0 4
Justice Black did not like the Frankfurter contextual approach
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He ar-
gued that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.105 This approach came to be known as to-
tal incorporation. Justice Black believed that through total incorpo-
ration the Court could avoid the vague and subjective standard of
"decency and fundamental justice." 06 Although Justice Black's ap-
proach did not attract a majority of the Court, as time went by the
Court selectively incorporated particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights and thereby automatically embraced the entire body of law
with regard to those provisions. Once a particular amendment had
101 It should be noted that the Due Process Clause has been broken down into two
subsidiary concepts. One is "substantive due process," represented by Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
"shocks the conscience." The other is "procedural due process." When the govern-
ment action is consistent with substantive due process, it still must comply with proce-
dural due process in depriving an individual of life, liberty or property in a fair and just
manner.
102 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
103 342 U.S. at 165.
104 Id at 173-74.
105 This approach is sometimes referred to as a "natural law" approach.
106 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
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been incorporated, judges had to follow the existing body of law
with regard to that amendment. 107 Thus, through selective incorpo-
ration, Justice Black's position ultimately won out in practice.' 08
Ironically, however, this restriction of an individual judge's flexibil-
ity also limits the judge's ability to consider the principle ofjudicial
integrity in his or her interpretation of due process.
As a result of incorporation, the Court has limited the meaning
of due process as an independent provision of the Bill of Rights.
For example, in Moran v. Burbine,'0 9 the police did not inform a sus-
pect who was being interrogated of his attorney's efforts to reach
him and at the same time falsely assured the attorney that the sus-
pect would not be questioned. The Court was content to analyze
the case under Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles. In briefly
considering due process, the Court found that the conduct fell short
of the kind of "misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civi-
lized society." 110
107 For example, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a case in which the
competence of counsel was raised, the Court recognized that the notion of a fair trial is
inherent in due process. The Court then turned to the Sixth Amendment to determine
the meaning of that term in the particular'instance. Id. at 685. "The Constitution guar-
antees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a
fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 684-85.
See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963) (through the Fourteenth
Amendment, "the Court has made obligatory on the states the Fifth Amendment's com-
mand that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
Eighth's ban on cruel and unusual punishment").
108 See William Cohen, Justices Black and Douglas and the "Natural-Law-Due-Process
Formula": Some Fragments of Intellectual History, 20 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 381, 382 (1987)
("Forty years ago, four dissenters in Adamson v. California debated among themselves an
issue now central in constitutional law.").
109 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
110 Id. at 433-34. The type of conduct that "shocks the conscience" has rarely been
found since Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Although the Rochin decision was
initially thought to be the basis for a broader concept of due process, it has largely been
limited to its facts. Rochin involved the use of a stomach pump to retrieve evidence. Id.
at 166. Thus, actions which violate due process because they shock the conscience gen-
erally involve bodily intrusions. For example, in United States v. Townsend, 151 F.
Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1957), the defendant was taken to police headquarters in the middle
of the night, beaten, denied the right to consult an attorney, then restrained by a detec-
tive while another man removed his pants and underwear and swabbed his penis for
evidence of blood in a rape case. The court concluded that this was a violation of the
defendant's due process rights and stated, "[n]o matter how great its relevance the court
could not permit the admission of evidence secured as a result of so flagrant an abuse of
basic rights and liberties." Id. at 382-83. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the
Court held that the state could not compel the respondent to undergo surgery to re-
trieve a bullet lodged in his chest to be used as evidence against him because it consti-
tuted an unreasonable search and would violate the respondent's Fourth Amendment
right to be secure in his person. Id. at 755. Finally, in United States ex rel. Guy v. Mc-
Cauley, 385 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Wis. 1974), a pregnant woman was forced to painfully
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Justice Stevens, in dissent, pointed out the dispatch with which
the Court dismissed the due process argument. 1 1' He argued for a
"standard of fairness, integrity, and honor" as opposed to a "shock
the conscience" test, and he would have considered the conduct in
this case to have violated due process.11 2 In language reminiscent
of the principle of judicial integrity expressing the symbolic impor-
tance of lawful actions by the Court, Stevens said, "[iun my judg-
ment, police interference in the attorney-client relationship is the
type of governmental misconduct on a matter of central importance
to the administration of justice that the Due Process Clause
prohibits."11 3
Herrera v. Collins 114 probably best represents the current state of
the judicial integrity debate within a due process context. 1 5 This
case involved a convicted murderer's petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds that new evidence discovered eight years after his con-
viction suggested his innocence. The petitioner argued that an exe-
cution without a hearing under the circumstances would violate his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 1 6 Surely the execution
of an innocent man would at least violate due process, and the al-
lowance of such a deplorable event by a court system would clearly
implicate notions of judicial integrity. This opinion, however, was
not necessarily shared by Justices Scalia and Thomas, who in con-
currence found no right under due process not to be executed if
newly discovered evidence indicated innocence. 1 7 They took issue
with the dissenting argument, which looked at the situation from a
broad substantive due process view and found that the execution of
bend over to submit to visual cavity searches by a policewoman subsequent to her arrest.
The district court found that this action violated the Due Process Clause. In contrast, in
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the Court found that it was not a violation of
petitioner's due process rights for a physician to take a blood sample while the petitioner
was unconscious in order to test the alcohol level. Id. at 434. The Court stated, "[tlo be
sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of
conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation of a
constitutional right; and certainly the test as administered here would not be considered
offensive by even the most delicate." Id. at 435-36. For a similar decision, see Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1967).
111 "The Court devotes precisely five sentences to its conclusion that the police inter-
ference ... did not violate the Due Process Clause." Moran, 475 U.S. at 466 (Stevens,J,
dissenting).
112 Id. at 466-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
115 While recognizing that Herrera also dealt with federalism and finality concerns, I
use the case to emphasize the judicial integrity aspect.
116 Id. at 856-57. He also argued that the execution would constitute a violation of
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision. Id. at 859.
117 Id. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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an innocent man is exactly the type of conduct which "shocks the
conscience."' "1 8 Justices Scalia and Thomas, finding no historical
basis for judicial review of newly discovered evidence, suggested
that the dissenting judges were applying nothing but their personal
opinions in finding that executing an innocent man shocks the con-
science. "If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and
remains widely approved) 'shocks' the dissenters' consciences ...
perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, or,
better still, the usefulness of 'conscience shocking' as a legal
test." 119
Although Justice Rehnquist,' 20 writing for the majority,
adopted the Scalia/Thomas approach and found that a request for a
new trial was not fundamental because it was not historically re-
quired and therefore did not violate due process, 12, he did concede
that if a petitioner could meet an "extraordinarily high" standard
and show actual innocence, and that there was no adequate state
avenue to raise a claim, then the execution might be
unconstitutional. 1
22
This most recent decision by the Supreme Court graphically
demonstrates that a majority of the Court is inclined to restrict the
scope of due process. Such a restriction of due process limits the
leeway afforded to judges and therefore reduces their opportunities
to exercise judicial integrity.
In analyzing the habeas corpus area, it appears that the Court is
concerned with the public perception of the court system, especially
when dealing with capital cases. The public is concerned with the
118 "Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency, or more
shocking to the conscience, than to execute a person who is actually innocent." Id. at
876 (Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter,JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). While discuss-
ing the defendant's substantive due process claim, the dissent compared this case with
Rochin and said that "[t]he lethal injection that petitioner faces as an allegedly innocent
person is certainly closer to the rack and the screw than the stomach pump condemned
in Rochin. Execution of an innocent person is the ultimate 'arbitrary impositio[n].' " Id.
at 879 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
119 Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in writing the majority opinion, was joined by Justices
O'Conner, Scalia, and Thomas.
121 Historically, new trials were granted only during the term of court in which the
final judgment was entered. Id. at 865. Today, to obtain a new trial in Texas on newly
discovered evidence the defendant must file a motion within thirty days after imposition
or suspension of sentence. Id. at 860.
122 Id. at 869. The Court also showed that the defendant could file a request for exec-
utive clemency, so there was a state course of action he could take. "History shows that
the traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too
late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency." Id. at 869.
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amount of time it takes to carry out a death sentence. 123 This senti-
ment has been characterized by the majority of the Court as concern
for the finality of state judgments. 124 As a result of this concern, the
Court has developed various doctrines to restrict the use of habeas
corpus petitions. 125 The Herrera decision was certainly consistent
with this trend.
V. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
A. INTRODUCTION
In Australia, the concept ofjudicial integrity can be found inter-
twined with the doctrine of the abuse of process. An area of legal
theory sometimes regarded as related to this doctrine is the discre-
tion to exclude evidence obtained by illegal or improper means
(which we refer to in the United States as the exclusionary rule). 12 6
Because the exclusionary rule has its own foundations and develop-
ment, it will be discussed separately. The doctrine of abuse of pro-
cess is best described as the inherent power of a court to prevent its
own process from being used as an instrument of unfairness or op-
pression. The cases discussed below illustrate that the two-fold
objectives of the doctrine of abuse of process are to prevent unfair-
ness and oppression and to maintain public confidence in the ad-
ministration of justice.
Australia and New Zealand do not have a Bill of Rights with the
accepted and enforceable powers contained in the United States
Constitution.127 Consequently, the protections afforded to an indi-
123 See, e.g., Andrew H. Malcolm, The Wait on Death Row, Legal Delays Thwart Death Pen-
alty, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at Al, cited in Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1993) (describing the capital
appeals process as a "legal game" designed to cause "delay, delay, delay").
124 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 491 (1991).
125 See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
126 See Matthew Goode, Comment, 12 CRIM. L.J. 114, 114-21 (1988).
127 See Interview with Justice J.EJ. Spender, An Overview of the Australian Federal Court
System, 16 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L. L. 453 (1990); Roger S. Clark, Introduction to A.H. Angelo
& Catherine Inder, New Zealand, in XII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
xvii (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). Clark states that "[t]here are no
fundamental human rights formally guaranteed in any New Zealand Constitutional doc-
ument." Id. at xviii. These rights are dealt with through common law, customary prac-
tices and legislation. There is, however, a New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 which
affirms, promotes and protects fundamental freedoms and human rights. Id. This act is
neither an entrenched law (it can be repealed at any time), "nor does it enable the courts
or any other body to decline to apply any provisions of any other enactment by reason of
it being inconsistent with any provision of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990."
Id. at xviii-xix.
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vidual in these criminal justice systems from police abuse or unfair
practices within the court system are largely creations of the judici-
ary itself.' 28 Thus, judges in both systems inherently possess a
greater degree of judicial discretion. This permissiveness toward
discretion is recognized at the appellate and trial levels. Appellate
review of a trial judge's discretionary decisions is necessarily rare,
and only occurs when "either that discretion possessed by the court
below was exercised on wrong principle, or ... was exercised in a
way which it could not reasonably have been exercised if the right
principles had been applied."' 129 Justice Spender, commenting on
the amount of discretion afforded a trial judge, explained that "dis-
cretion will be reviewed with a large amount of deference to the first
judge. The exercise ofjudicial discretion will only be reversed if the
appeal court is convinced it was wrong."' 30 Thus, the doctrine of
abuse of process in Australia has a great allowance for and tolerance
of judicial discretion.
B. ABUSE OF PROCESS-AUSTRALIA
Australia has seen a cautious but steady development of the
doctrine of abuse of process. 13' In comparing this doctrine with
that in the United States, it has elements of both the supervisory
powers and due process cases previously discussed. It should also
be pointed out again that the abuse of process doctrine allows for
the exclusionary remedy but is not limited to it.
The origins of the doctrine are found in the 1964 English case
of Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions.132 In Connelly, the defend-
ant was charged, tried, and convicted of murder. He appealed suc-
cessfully and the conviction was quashed. 33 The prosecution then
charged him with robbery, arising out of the same facts.' 34 For
technical reasons this re-charging was lawful. The defendant ar-
gued that, even though the laying of the second indictment was law-
ful, it was nonetheless oppressive. The prosecution, he claimed,
128 Some, however, are legislative in origin.
129 Walker v. Marklew, 14 S.A. St. R. 463, 469 (1976).
130 Interview with Justice J.EJ. Spender, supra note 127, at 475.
131 See Goode, supra note 126, at 115 (this doctrine is highly discretionary and is
checked by the "cautious application principle: That is, it is only to be applied in rare
and exceptional cases where the abuse has been clearly demonstrated"); Editorial, The
High Court and Criminal Law, 11 CRIM. L. J. 1, 1 (1987) ("The court has over the past
decade consistently applied liberal policies in respect of criminal law and has generally
favoured individual rights.").
132 1964 App. Gas. 1254 (H.L.).
133 Id. at 1295 (Lord Reid).
134 Id. at 1281.
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was abusing the processes of the court by bringing this second
prosecution. 135
The House of Lords, in considering the important public policy
considerations involved, recognized that "it is the courts' duty to
conduct their proceedings so as to command the respect and confi-
dence of the public."' 136 This is the symbolic aspect ofjudicial integ-
rity we discussed with reference to the United States. l3 7 The
prosecution argued that it may be trusted not to abuse its powers,
but the response from Lord Devlin demonstrated the clear rejection
of a passive role by the courts.
Are the courts to rely on the executive to protect their process from
abuse? Have they not themselves an inescapable duty to secure fair
treatment for those who come or are brought before them? To ques-
tions of this sort there is only one possible answer. The courts cannot
contemplate for a moment the transference to the executive of the re-
sponsibility for seeing that the process of law is not abused.' 38
The court's exercise of judicial integrity through the use of its
inherent discretionary power to control its own processes resulted
in the quashing of the second indictment. The court determined
that the defendant was being oppressed by the procedure employed
by the prosecution and intervened to prevent its own processes
from being abused.' 3 9 By allowing each branch (prosecution and
court) to assess independently the indictment, the court creates a
functional system of checks and balances. 140
In Australia, there has been a complete acceptance of Connelly,
and a cautious, but undeniable, development of the doctrine of
abuse of process. 14 1 One of the guiding principles is the desire of
the courts to maintain judicial integrity-in other words, to conduct
their proceedings fairly and in a manner which will maintain public
confidence in the proper administration ofjustice. The case of Bar-
ton v. The Queen 142 is an example of abuse of the court procedures by
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1353 (Lord Devlin).
137 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
138 Connelly, 1964 App. Gas. at 1360 (Lord Devlin).
139 Id. at 1354 (Lord Devlin).
140 See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a check and balance discussion with
regard to judicial integrity in the United States.
141 See, e.g.,Jago v. District Court of N.S.W., 168 G.L.R. 23 (Austl. 1989) (holding that
the right to a speedy trial is inseperable from the right to a fair trial); Regina v. Vuckov,
40 S.A. St. R. 498 (1986) (discussing whether entrapment is an "abuse of the process of
Court," or whether it is a separate defence); Barton v. The Queen, 147 C.L.R. 75 (Austl.
1980) (discussing the court's power to stay the proceedings in order to ensure a fair
trial).
142 Barton, 147 C.L.R. at 75.
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a party. The defendant, Barton, was directly indicted in a criminal
prosecution without first being given the benefit of the usual prelim-
inary hearing.' 43 Although the method of direct indictment was un-
orthodox, it was nevertheless a valid procedure. Barton sought a
stay of the proceedings, because he claimed the denial of a prelimi-
nary hearing was oppressive conduct by the prosecution utilized to
circumvent the usual procedures.1 44 The High Court agreed that it
was oppressive and granted a temporary stay of the indictment until
a preliminary hearing had been conducted.1 45 This was a sufficient
remedy in the circumstances because it rectified the harm to the
defendant.
It is important to note that the conduct of the prosecution in
Barton was not illegal. 146 Yet the court indicated that any conduct
serious enough to produce oppression is amenable to judicial super-
vision under the courts' inherent jurisdiction to prevent misuse of
procedures or to prevent outright misuse of the court system itself.
The court noted that "it is quite another thing to say the courts are
powerless to prevent an abuse of process or the prosecution of a
criminal proceeding in a manner which will result in a trial which is
unfair when judged by reference to accepted standards of jus-
tice."' 147 The Australian High Court's intervention in Barton, de-
spite the lack of illegal prosecutorial conduct stands in sharp
contrast with the trend in the United States. The United States
Supreme Court has refused to utilize its supervisory powers where
the conduct is facially legal. 148
As stated earlier, since Australia does not have a Bill of Rights
and consequently has no constitutionally delineated safeguards, the
doctrine of abuse of process has been utilized to provide rights not
otherwise granted. The right to a speedy trial presents an illustra-
tion of this approach.
Injago v. District Court of N.S. W,149 the High Court of Australia
held that even though there was no common law right to a speedy
trial, the right of an accused person to receive a fair trial was one of
the entrenched rights of the Australian legal system.' 50 If circum-
143 Id. at 81.
144 Id. at 87 (Gibbs & Mason, JJ.).
145 Id. at 87-88 (Gibbs & Mason, JJ.).
146 Id. at 103 (Gibbs & Mason, JJ.). There is a procedure for the prosecution to bring
about an indictment like this. However, in this case, it was argued that it was brought for
an unlawful purpose, capriciously and arbitrarily. Id. at 87-88 (Gibbs & Mason, JJ.).
147 Id. at 95-96 (Gibbs & Mason, JJ.).
148 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
149 168 C.L.R. 23 (Austl. 1989).
150 Id. at 31-35 (Mason, J.).
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stances, including unreasonable delay, had the effect of irretrievably
robbing the trial of fairness, then a permanent stay of the proceed-
ings was warranted. This remedy was not granted lightly, and ex-
treme circumstances would have to be demonstrated. 151 The public
policy served by this doctrine is that no public interest is served by
convicting a person by any means other than a fair trial.
The symbolic aspect of judicial integrity can be found in the
language of theJago court: "[it is] the responsibility of the courts to
see that justice is done to the parties and to the wider community,
ensuring that the appropriate remedy is applied in the particular
case." 5
2
The central prescript of our criminal law is that no person shall be
convicted of crime otherwise than after a fair trial according to law. A
conviction cannot stand if irregularity or prejudicial occurrence has
permeated or affected proceedings to an extent that the overall trial
has been rendered unfair or has lost its character as a trial according to
law.153
The High Court of Australia has refused to define the scope of
its supervisory powers doctrine in absolute terms; thus, it has al-
lowed for flexible application. 154 This lack of restrictive definition
also appears in the context of due process fairness principles. How
is the court to deal with the numerous types of abuse of process that
can be imagined? In the words of Justice Deane inJago:
The general notion of fairness which has inspired much of the tradi-
tional criminal law of this country defies analytical definition. Nor is it
possible to catalogue in the abstract the occurrences outside or within
the actual trial which will or may affect the overall trial to an extent
that it can no longer properly be regarded as a fair one .... [T]he
identification of what does and what does not remove the quality of
fairness from an overall trial must proceed on a case by case basis and
involve an undesirably, but unavoidably, large content of essentially
intuitive judgment. The best that one can do is to formulate relevant
general propositions and examples derived from past experience. 155
This flexible and very fluid concept of fairness stands in sharp
contrast with the United States' approach to due process fairness.
As previously indicated, through incorporation, the due process
concept has largely merged with rights protected by various amend-
ments to the Constitution. Due process has an independent applica-
tion in the United States but it has been limited to that activity that
151 Id. (holding that the circumstances inJago do not merit a stay).
152 Id. at 71 (Toohey,J.).
153 Id. at 56 (Deane, J.).
154 See Barton v. The Queen, 147 C.L.R. 75, 96-97 (Austl. 1980).
155 Jago, 168 C.L.R. 57 (Deane, J.).
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"shocks the conscience."1 56 SurelyJustice Stevens-who argued for
a "standard of fairness, integrity, and honor," as opposed to a
"shocks the conscience" approach-would be happier with the lan-
guage of theJago decision.1 57
The defense of entrapment presents a good example of the use
of the abuse of process doctrine in dealing with serious police mis-
conduct. In the Australian legal system, a defense of entrapment
akin to what is known in the United States158 is not recognized. In
discussing the symbolic objective of utilizing the entrapment de-
fense, the South Australian Supreme Court stated that prosecution
may be stayed as an abuse of process if "to allow the courts to be
used to pursue a prosecution founded on official incitement would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute."1 59
Without resorting to a complex set of rules and exemptions to
cover official incitement to commit crime, at least one Australian
state supreme court preferred to say:
[I]n a case where the police or their informer have acted improperly in
attempting to trap a defendant, it will be a matter in the end of apply-
ing the test laid down in Bunning v. Cross-of looking at all the circum-
stances of the case, with the competing requirements of public policy
in mind, and deciding whether the defendant has made out his claim
that the prosecution should be stopped because it would be an abuse
of the process of the court to allow it to proceed. 160
This approach to entrapment gives the courts leeway to grant
the appropriate remedy, which may be either the suppression of evi-
dence, a permanent stay of the proceedings, or some other remedy,
depending upon the particular circumstances. This reasoning is
consistent with later High Court judgments about the doctrine of
abuse of process, and consequently there is every reason to believe
that the High Court would confirm this approach if it were ever
156 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see supra note 110 and accompanying
text.
157 Moran v. Burbine,, 475 U.S. 412, 466-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes
109-113 and accompanying text.
158 Entrapment is a criminal defense in the United States. The defendant has the
burden of proof and must produce evidence to support a plea of entrapment. If be-
lieved, the defendant will be acquitted. Although entrapment is not a constitutional
defense, it is currently recognized as a defense in all 50 states and the federal courts.
Although the definition of entrapment varies in each jurisdiction, it usually requires
proof that: (1) the defendant was induced to commit a crime by a government agent
(usually undercover); (2) the defendant or any reasonable person would not have com-
mitted the crime but for the inducement, and (3) the government agent acted as he did
in order to obtain evidence to prosecute the defendant. See DRESSLER, supra note 89, at
357.
159 Regina v. Vuckov, 40 S.A. St. R. 498, 518 (1986) (Cox, J.).
160 Id. at 523 (footnote omitted).
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called upon to do so.16 1
The South Australia State Supreme Court was emphasizing the
fundamental virtue of judicial integrity when it said that it has the
power to stay permanently a prosecution on public policy grounds
"where the evidence shows that it would be unfair to the defendant
or an affront to the public conscience to permit the prosecution to
proceed."' 162 This is the court acting for society as a symbol of law-
fulness and justice.
The "affront to the public conscience" or the "public confi-
dence in the administration ofjustice" referred to by the Australian
judges should not be confused with notions of popularity. The
courts are talking about what is right and proper and in the commu-
nity's best long-term interests. Decisions based on sound principles
may often be unpopular, especially where the accused appears to be
guilty of a crime.
The scope of the abuse of process doctrine is still unknown. It
continues to develop case by case as the need for special remedies
arises. In various Australian state supreme courts, the power to
grant a remedy, including a permanent stay or quashing of an indict-
ment, has been recognized as applicable (in appropriate cases) to
the misuse of extradition powers,' 63 to delay in commencing a pros-
ecution and bringing it to trial, 164 and even to prejudicial pretrial
publicity. 165
C. ABUSE OF PROCESS-NEW ZEALAND
In New Zealand, one can find indications that the doctrine of
abuse of process has also been accepted. Based on the earlier Eng-
lish authorities, 166 the New Zealand courts clearly affirmed the exist-
ence of the doctrine within their own jurisdiction in Regina v.
Hartley.' 67 This is the case referred to in the introduction of this
Article in which a man was illegally extradited from Australia to New
Zealand. 168 The New Zealand authorities telephoned the Australian
Police, told them that they wanted the man back in New Zealand,
and asked that he be put on the next plane to New Zealand. The
161 See Editorial, supra note 131, at 1.
162 Vuckov, 40 S.A. St. R. at 522 (Cox, J.).
163 See Perry v. Lean, 39 S.A. St. R. 515 (1985).
164 See Clayton v. Ralphs, 45 S.A. St. R. 347 (1987); Kintominas v. Attorney General,
24 A. Crim. R. 456 (1987); Herron v. McGregor, 6 N.S.W.L.R. 246 (1986).
165 See Regina v. Von Einem, 55 S.A. St. R. 199 (1990).
166 Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Humphreys, 1977 App. Cas. 1 (H.L.); Connelly v.
Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1964 App. Cas. 1254 (H.L.).
167 2 N.Z.L.R. 199 (C.A. 1978).
168 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
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Australian Police complied with this request without any formal ex-
tradition proceeding.' 69 Upon his arrival in New Zealand, the man
was arrested and subsequently put on trial. The defendant was tried
and convicted, after which he appealed. 170 One of the grounds of
appeal was that, even if lawfully arrested in New Zealand, the
method by which he was returned to New Zealand was oppressive.
He contended that the proceedings constituted an abuse of process
and that his conviction should be quashed. 17 1 The conviction was
quashed on a related ground, but the court said:
Some may say that in the present case a New Zealand citizen attempted
to avoid a criminal responsibility by leaving the country: [sic] that his
subsequent conviction has demonstrated the utility of the short cut
adopted by the police to have him brought back. But this must never
become an area where it will be sufficient to consider that the end has
justified the means. The issues raised by this affair are basic to the
whole concept of freedom in society.
172
The same concerns for sanctioning illegality are evident in the
later case of Moevao v. Department of Labour.17 Moevao complied
with the Department of Labour and was told that his permit for per-
manent residence was to be granted. Shortly thereafter, there was
some confusion and an official who had not previously dealt with
Moevao charged him with overstaying his temporary entry per-
mit. 174 Even though both Moevao and the officials at the depart-
ment with whom he had originally dealt relied on the fact that
Moevao's permanent permit was to be granted, the court convicted
him anyway for overstaying his temporary permit.' 75 The court,
while recognizing an inherent power to stay proceedings which con-
stitute an abuse of the court's process, did not rule that this case
presented such an abuse. 176 The court, however, did focus on the
public perception of the court as a symbol of lawful and just proce-
dure as opposed to an instrument to set the guilty free.
It is not the purpose of the criminal law to punish the guilty at all
costs. It is not that the end may justify whatever means may have been
adopted. There are two related aspects of the public interest which
bear on this. The first is that the public interest in the due administra-
tion of justice necessarily extends to ensuring that the Court's
processes are used fairly by State and citizen alike.... This leads on to
169 Id. at 213.
170 Id. at 200.
'71 Id. at 215-19.
172 Id. at 216-17 (Woodhouse, J.).
173 1 N.Z.L.R. 464 (C.A. 1980).
174 Id. at 471.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 477-83 (Richardson, J.).
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the second aspect of the public interest which is in the maintenance of
public confidence in the administration ofjustice. It is contrary to the
public interest to allow that confidence to be eroded by a concern that
the Court's processes may lend themselves to oppression and
injustice. 1
77
The concern is with conduct on the part of a litigant in relation to
the case which unchecked would strike at the public confidence in the
Court's processes and so diminish the Court's ability to fulfil[sic] its
function as a Court of law. As [Justice Frankfurter said in Sherman v.
United States, "p]ublic confidence in the fair and honorable administra-
tion of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the
transcending value at stake."
1 7 8
There is a stated desire by the courts in New Zealand to con-
sider the concept of judicial integrity. However, there are fewer re-
ported cases to be found in New Zealand dealing with abuse of
process. Thus, the development of the abuse of process doctrine
cannot be traced as thoroughly in New Zealand as in the case of
Australian case law. 179  ,
D. EXCLUSIONARY RULE-AUSTRALIA
The roots of the exclusionary rule in Australia can be traced to
the decision of Regina v. Ireland,18 0 which dealt with the admission of
illegally obtained evidence. In this decision, the court suggested a
standard for an exclusionary rule that first recognized the impor-
tance of judicial discretion and then suggested a balancing formula
which weighed the public interest in convicting the guilty against the
public interest in ensuring fair treatment of individuals.
Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness appears, the judge has a
discretion to reject the evidence.... In the exercise of it, the compet-
ing public requirements must be considered and weighed against each
other. On the one hand there is the public need to bring to conviction
those who commit criminal offenses. On the other hand there is the
public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and
unfair treatment. Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or un-
fair acts may be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial
discretion.
1 8 t
Justice Spender characterized these ideas as due process as prac-
ticed in Australia.
18 2
177 Id. at 481 (citation omitted).
178 Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
179 "In New Zealand, this power of criminal courts has received comparatively little
attention." Id. at 470 (Richmond, P.).
180 126 C.L.R. 321 (H.C. 1970).
181 Id- at 335.
182 Interview with Justice J.EJ. Spender, supra note 127, at 475.
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Bunning v. Cross,183 following the lead of Ireland, is generally re-
garded as the leading case on the exclusionary remedy in Australia.
In formulating a standard for the exclusion of evidence, the court
was obviously influenced by notions ofjudicial integrity.184 The de-
cision focused not only on the unfairness to the accused, but also on
society's right to insist, especially with increased use of technology
by law enforcement, "that those who enforce the law themselves re-
spect it, so that a citizen's precious right to immunity from arbitrary
and unlawful intrusion into the daily affairs of private life may re-
main unimpaired."' 1 5 In this way, the court should act as a monitor
or check on the power of the executive. "Were there to occur
wholesale and deliberate disregard of these [legislative] safeguards
its toleration by the courts would result in the effective abrogation
of the legislature's safeguards of individual liberties, subordinating
it to the executive arm."' 86 In addition, the court, citing the Holmes
dissent in Olmstead,187 indicated that it did not want to be associated
with bad conduct by acquiescing to it. "In appropriate cases it may
be 'a less evil that some criminal should escape than that the Gov-
ernment should play an ignoble part.' "188 To emphasize the point
further, the court claimed its goal in the exercise of discretion was
"to resolve the apparent conflict between the desirable goal of
bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of
curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful
conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law."' 189
The Australian High Court, in discussing the criteria for exclu-
sion of evidence, did not ignore the probative value of the evidence
to be suppressed but greatly discounted its importance. "Truth,
like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be pursued
too keenly-may cost too much."' 90 The criterion for determining
whether exclusion should occur specifically is that the probative
value should be considered only where there is a good faith error
(understandably mistaken assessment). When there is a deliberate
183 141 C.L.R. 54 (H.C. 1978).
184 Id. at 65 (Barwick, CJ.); id. at 68-81 (Stephen & Aikin, JJ.).
185 Id. at 75.
186 Id. at 77-78. The New Zealand High Court has demonstrated a similar concern for
judicial integrity. "Another way of expressing the foundation of the second discretion is
that it relates to the rejection of evidence where its admission would be calculated to
bring the administration ofjustice into disrepute." Regina v. Dally, 2 N.Z.L.R. 184, 192
(H.C. 1990) (citation omitted).
187 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188 Bunning, 141 C.L.R. at 78 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
189 Id. at 74.
190 Id. at 72 (quoting Pearse v. Pearse, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (H.C. 1946)).
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violation by the police, the probative value of the evidence should
generally not be considered. 191 Thus, if the previously discussed
United States v. Payner192 were being decided in Australia, the delib-
erate acts by the government would likely preclude consideration of
the probative value of the evidence to be excluded.
Among the other factors to be considered in Australia are com-
parison of the seriousness of the offense with the unlawful conduct
of the police, as well as specific legislative intent to restrict and pro-
hibit the particular unlawful conduct.
Thus, some impropriety by a police officer will not lead to the exclu-
sion of the evidence in every instance. If there was a deliberate and
wanton abuse of a person's rights, then clearly the evidence will be
excluded. If on the other hand, the impropriety is a technicality or the
result of an inadvertent slip, the court will be inclined to allow the
resultant evidence to be admitted.' 93
There was conflicting authority on the scope of Bunning v. Cross.
Was the exclusionary remedy limited to real (tangible) evidence or
did it have broader application to intangible evidence, such as a
statement? This question was answered by the High Court in Cle-
land v. Regina. 194 This case concerned the admissibility of a confes-
sion. 195 The question posed was whether, if a confession was
voluntary and it logically would not be unfair to the accused to ad-
mit it, the court nonetheless has discretion to exclude it under Bun-
ning v. Cross, if the confession was obtained unlawfully or unfairly. 196
The Court held that the trial judge does have broad discretion,
including the discretion described in Bunning v. Cross. This repre-
sented not only an acceptance of Bunning v. Cross, but a clear state-
ment that the discretion had a wide area of operation.
191 The court mentions an exception when the evidence is vital and perishable so that
any delay might result in the loss of the evidence. Id. at 79.
192 447 U.S. 727 (1980); see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
193 Interview with Justice J.E.J. Spender, supra note 127, at 474.
194 151 C.L.R. I (H.C. 1982). Cleland was arrested and taken to the police station at
2:00 p.m. where he stayed until midnight. Not once during this time was he taken to a
magistrate or justice as required by law. This custody made his detention unlawful after
5:30 p.m. It was during this time that his confession was rendered. Id. at 5. At trial, he
did not claim that the confession was coerced. Instead, he denied the confession. Since
the confession was received during an unlawful detention, its value was questionable.
Id.
195 According to ChiefJustice Gibbs:
A confession will not be admitted unless it was made voluntarily, that is in the exer-
cise of a free choice to speak or be silent. But even if the statement was voluntary,
and therefore admissible, the trial judge has a discretion to reject it if he considers
that it was obtained in circumstances that would render it unfair to use it against the
accused.




There seems no reason in principle why the rule in Bunning v. Cross
should be confined to real evidence, although that is its "principal area
of operation." It should however be made clear that there is no gen-
eral rule that the court will reject evidence illegally obtained. On the
contrary, the rejection of confessional evidence for this reason alone is
most exceptional.'
9 7
This somewhat hesitant view was taken by three members of the
Court. 198 The other two justices, Murphy and Deane, held a
stronger view about the exclusion of a confession obtained by un-
lawful or improper conduct. Their view clearly implicated notions
of judicial integrity. Justice Murphy said that if a voluntary confes-
sion would not have come into existence except for unlawful or im-
proper conduct, the court could exclude evidence on the
discretionary ground of public policy.' 9 9
Where a confession was obtained by unlawful or improper conduct
then, in my opinion, the evidence should generally be excluded. Such
a course will tend to preserve observance of law and decency in its
administration. A confession or admission resulting from an interro-
gation whilst in unlawful custody should ordinarily be rejected on pub-
lic policy grounds. There are very powerful social considerations in
deterring police from unlawfully imprisoning persons. The general
rule may be departed from if the unlawful or improper conduct was
technical or slight.
200
E. EXCLUSIONARY RULE-NEW ZEALAND
The New Zealand court, rather than relying on the weighing
formula found in Bunning v. Cross, has formulated an imprecise and
broad standard of unfairness to determine whether to exclude evi-
dence as a result of a particular police practice. 20 ' The court opted
for this type of standard so as not to force judges into a more rigid
standard. This type of standard, as one would logically conclude,
197 Id. at 9 (Gibbs, CJ.).
198 Gibbs, CJ., Wilson & Dawson, JJ.
'99 Id. at 16 (Murphy, J.).
200 Id. at 16-17 (Murphy, J.) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). Justice De-
ane also addressed the issue as to what grounds a discretionary decision to exclude con-
fessions should be based:
The difference of opinion among judges of the Supreme Court of South Australia
concerns whether, in a case where the making of a voluntary confession has been
procured by unlawful or improper conduct on the part of those whose duty it is to
enforce the law, the particular discretion to exclude evidence of a voluntary confes-
sional statement on the grounds of unfairness to the accused and the more general
discretion to exclude unlawfully and improperly obtained evidence are both rele-
vant or whether one or the other of those discretions alone is involved. The more
common view among judges of the Supreme Court who have been called upon to
consider the matter has been that both discretions are relevant.
Id. at 19-20 (Deane, J.).
201 Regina v. Dally, 2 N.Z.L.R. 184 (H.C. 1990) (Eichelbaum, CJ.).
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has resulted in a great deal of discretion that may be exercised by
individual judges. In describing when the discretion should be ex-
ercised, given its broad interpretation of unfairness, the court has
stated that it should be used "where there has been some undesir-
able practice indulged in by the police in obtaining evidence; a type
of practice which requires censure by the court.
'20 2
This type of broad discretion with a standard of unfairness that
the court has been reluctant to define could lead to a great deal of
subjectivity by individual judges. However, the court in New Zea-
land has indicated that it is better to trust in the judiciary than to
shackle their power.203 This bold approach is reminiscent ofJustice
Frankfurter's approach to due process. 20
4
VI. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY: UNITED STATES WITH AUSTRALIA AND
NEw ZEALAND
The two related objectives supporting judicial integrity, avoid-
ing complicity with wrongful acts and acting as a symbol in main-
taining fundamental rights, have been discounted by a majority of
the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. With regard to
complicity with wrongful acts, the Court has taken a view that
equates judicial integrity with deterrence. Thus, the Court has
looked only at the specific act of a police officer, an act that has al-
ready occurred at the time the government seeks to introduce the
evidence. 20 5 The Court has reasoned that since the past bad act has
already been completed, the Court is not associated with it by the
introduction of the evidence. This approach ignores the facts that
the court is also a governmental actor and that further harm occurs
by the introduction of the evidence. This alternative view was ex-
pressed by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
"no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor
and the Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit
district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not
permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed."
206
United States v. Payner20 7 provides a powerful illustration of the
Court's position on the symbolic effect ofjudicial integrity. Judicial
202 Regina v. Lee, 1 N.Z.L.R. 481, 487 (H.C. 1978).
203 See Selvey v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 2 W.L.R. 1494, 1523-24 (1968) (Lord
Guest); see also J.B. Dawson, The Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: A Comparative
Study, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 513 (1982).
204 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 26-59 and accompanying text.
206 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
207 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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integrity no longer symbolizes justice for all society, rather, it now
symbolizes a concern for the guilty going free because of the exclu-
sion of probative but tainted evidence, because "after all, it is the
defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial." 208 Robert Bork
captured this sentiment when he commented:
[One of the reasons] sometimes given [in support of the exclusionary
rule] is that courts shouldn't soil their hands by allowing in unconstitu-
tionally acquired evidence. I have never been convinced by that argu-
ment because it seems the conscience of the court ought to be at least
equally shaken by the idea of turning a criminal loose upon
society." 2
09
This concern not to free the guilty defendant would seem to be
an abrogation of the Court's responsibility to maintain control of
the executive by ensuring that the agents of the executive engage in
lawful conduct. This concept of checks and balances was envisioned
by our founding fathers. 210 The language of Justice Holmes, who
urges us not to focus on the individual criminal going free but to
direct our attention to the importance of controlling the power of
the police, is illustrative. "[I]t is a less[er] evil that some criminal
should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part."2 1' In addition, it is short-sighted to focus on the results of an
individual case (the possibility of a guilty person going free).212 As
208 Id. at 734.
209 Yale Kamisar, 'Comparative Reprehensibility' and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1987) (quoting McGuigan, An Interview with Judge Robert
Bork, JUD. NOTICE, June 1986, at 1, 6). Is it true that society really is less concerned
about the Court acting as a beacon for lawful conduct (justice) than, as the Court sug-
gests in Payner, about a criminal going free-especially if the error committed by a police
officer is minimal? Would a lack of proportionality between the error committed and
the release of a criminal look like an injustice? John Kaplan raised this point in talking
about the exclusionary rule.
Moreover, in actual operation, the rule would seem to injure judicial integrity far
more than it serves that end. And finally, any moral end that is served in the name
ofjudicial integrity must be balanced against our sense of injustice not only at let-
ting a serious criminal go free, but at letting him go free because of what may be
trivial error by the police.
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 n.53 (1974).
210 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying test.
211 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
212 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 951 n.11 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
In another measure of the rule's impact-the number of prosecutions that are dis-
missed or result in acquittals in cases where evidence has been excluded-the avail-
able data again show that the Court's past assessment of the rule's costs has
generally been exaggerated. For example, a study based on data from 9 [sic] mid-
sized counties in Illinois, Michigan and Pennsylvania reveals that motions to sup-
press physical evidence were filed in approximately 5% of the 7,500 cases studied,
but that such motions were successful in only 0.7% of all these cases."
Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Peter Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule:
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the New Zealand High Court said in Moevao, "[t]he due administra-
tion ofjustice is a continuous process, not confined to the determi-
nation of the particular case." '2 18
Another area where the United States Supreme Court has been
concerned with the public perception has been in the use of habeas
corpus petitions. 214 In large measure, restrictions on the use of
habeas corpus petitions have been the result of finality concerns. The
public is upset about the amount of time it takes to effectuate a
death sentence. 215 Popular concerns for executing the guilty, how-
ever, should have no place in judicial decision making and certainly
should not replace the deeply rooted notions that the court is a sym-
bol of lawfulness and justice.216
It should also be pointed out that public sentiment is erratic
and therefore it is often difficult for the court to have an accurate
reading of this sentiment. The Rodney King saga graphically dem-
onstrates the fickleness of public sentiment. Polls taken shortly after
the initial verdict acquitting the four police officers of beating Rod-
ney King show that the public was concerned that the court system
ignored official misconduct. 217 This public concern existed even
though Mr. King was reputed to have an extensive criminal record
and the police used the defense that they were just doing theirjobs.
In addition, unlike the habeas corpus area, finality concerns were
ignored by the public, who wanted to see a retrial of the police of-
ficers. The republican administration, which largely had been sensi-
tive to finality concerns as well as other law enforcement issues,
An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 596). Justice Brennan contin-
ued: "[t]he study also shows that only 0.6% of all cases resulted in acquittals because
evidence had been excluded." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Nardulli, supra, at
600).
213 Moevao v. Department of Labour, 1 N.Z.L.R. 464, 481 (C.A. 1980) (Richardson,
J.).
214 See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 123.
216 See, e.g., Lay, supra note 123, at 1015; Mercer v. Armontrout, 864 F.2d 1429, 1431
(8th Cir. 1988) ("If the law is not given strict adherence, then we as a society are just as
guilty of a heinous crime as the condemned felon. It should thus be readily apparent
that the legal process in a civilized society must not rush to judgment and thereafter to
execute a person found guilty of taking the life of another."); Debra Cassens Moss,
Death, Habeas, and Good Lawyers: Balancing Fairness and Finality, 78 A.B.A.J. 83, 84 (1992)
("To learn about the extent of errors at trial, the ABA studied published habeas deci-
sions by Federal Appeals Courts in capital cases from July 1976 to May 1991. It found
that in 401%] of the cases, the state conviction or death sentence was reversed because
of constitutional violations.")
217 See Richard Morin, Polls Uncover Much Common Ground on L.A. Verdict, WASH. POST,
May 11, 1992, at A15 (explaining that "[t]he earliest polls, most conducted within three
days of the verdict. . . , [found the majority] of blacks and whites rejected the jury's
verdict and demanded federal action against the four police officers").
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made the decision to retry the police officers in the federal court.
This example demonstrates that public sentiment is variable and dif-
ficult to monitor. Courts, in making decisions, should adhere to no-
tions of justice and fairness and not to what might be the latest
public sentiment.
The judiciary in America was envisioned by our ancestors as an
independent body not subject to outside influences. The fickle
whims of the public should not be an influence, as the courts need
to rise above the fray and maintain themselves as a symbol of lawful-
ness. Decisions based upon sound principles may often be unpopu-
lar, especially where the accused appears to be guilty of a crime. As
stated by Justice Frankfurter, "[p]ublic confidence in the fair and
honorable administration ofjustice, upon which ultimately depends
the rule of law, is the transcending value at stake. '2 18 Thus, it is in
the long-term interest of a society based upon the rule of law that its
courts should be a symbol of lawfulness. This is the essential value
at stake.
The standard for exclusion in Australia and New Zealand is a
reflection of the underlying goals ofjudicial integrity. Where there
has been deliberate illegal conduct, the court, in an effort to symbol-
ize lawful acts rather than to sanction or participate in such illegal
conduct, ignores the probative value of the excluded evidence.
Where the police violation is non-intentional, the concern for sanc-
tioning that which is non-deliberate is less acute. Moreover, sym-
bolically the public will not think less of the courts for not severely
penalizing such conduct. New Zealand, by its broad flexible stan-
dard, has exhibited considerable trust in the court system vis-a-vis
individual judges to do what is fair. This trust is an acceptance of
the courts' ability to exercise judicial integrity.
Although there appears to be authority to exercise judicial in-
tegrity in Australia and New Zealand, there is no guarantee that this
discretion is in fact exercised. Professor Bradley recognizes that
there is indeed considerable discretion to exclude real as well as
confessional evidence due to police misconduct, but he points out
that it is rarely used.21 9 "Is a discretionary rule, then, the only hon-
est answer? Certainly, the discretionary rule currently in force in
Australia, which is often mentioned but rarely acted on can hardly
be considered an adequate safeguard for civil liberties." 220 There
218 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
219 Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz": Lessons for America, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1990); see also K. SHROFF & S. CLARKE, ADMISSIBILITY OF
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 45-54 (1981).
220 Bradley, supra note 219, at 122 (footnote omitted).
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is, however, some difference of opinion with Professor Bradley's as-
sessment. 22 1 Furthermore, given the reluctance to review a trial
judge's discretionary action, there are likely to be instances when
exclusion or other remedies utilizing the abuse of process doctrine
will not come to the attention of an appellate court.222
What has occurred in the United States Supreme Court is a nar-
rowing of the concept of judicial integrity. In other words, it has
chosen to discount improper or even illegal conduct by the execu-
tive. On the other hand, in Australia and New Zealand, the courts,
through their discretionary power, have evolved into showing (at
least by their words as opposed to deeds) a concern for the public
perception of the justice system as a watchful monitor of improper
executive actions.
VII. SUMMARY: AN ARGUMENT FOR REINSTITUTING JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY
Insofar as they are used as instrumentalities in the administration
of criminal justice, the federal courts have an obligation to set their
face against enforcement of the law by lawless means or means that
violate rationally vindicated standards ofjustice, and to refuse to sus-
tain such methods by effectuating them. They do this in the exercise
of a recognized jurisdiction to formulate and apply "proper standards
for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the federal courts,"
an obligation that goes beyond the conviction of the particular defend-
ant before the court. Public confidence in the fair and honorable ad-
ministration ofjustice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law,
is the transcending value at stake.2
23
This plea for what some might consider judicial activism is not
judicial activism at all. It is grounded in the historical role envi-
sioned for our court system. Professor Dworkin defines a judicial
activist as a judge "[who] would ignore the Constitution's text, the
history of its enactment, prior decisions of the Supreme Court inter-
preting it, and long-standing traditions of our political culture. '224
In our political culture, society sees the court as a symbol ofjustice.
The court derives this status from its role as part of the separation
of powers because it acts as a check on the proper conduct of the
executive and legislative branches. In order to accomplish this task,
221 Mark Griffin, an experienced criminal lawyer in Australia, reports that there are
many instances when a trial judge will utilize the abuse of process doctrine. Interviews
with Mark Griffin, Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School (Spring/Summer 1993).
222 Interview with Justice J.E.J. Spender, supra note 127, at 469 (stating that review of
a trial judge's discretionary decisions by an appellate court is rare).
223 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (citation omitted)).
224 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 378 (1986).
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the court must employ judicial discretion. As demonstrated in this
Article, there is ample precedent for the exercise of judicial integ-
rity. This can be found in the original justification for the exclusion-
ary rule, the utilization of supervisory powers, and the original
concept of due process.
When a judge abides by proper judicial principles and seeks
justice, fairness and equality before the law, discretion is more than
just a good thing; it is essential to fashion a just decision. It is im-
possible to delineate in advance all the circumstances which will call
for a set standard. Thus, one realizes the importance of a flexible
standard requiring discretionary power.
A need for clear, consistent and concise decisions so as to pro-
vide guidance and direction to the lower courts is often the argu-
ment against too much judicial discretion. On the other hand, given
the fact-specific nature of our system, there is a need to respond to
certain activities which have not yet arisen in prior cases.
Implicit in the demise ofjudicial integrity is an inherent distrust
in the court system to do the right thing in sanctioning official mis-
conduct.225 It is assumed to be prudent to limit courts' discretion-
ary power because judges cannot be trusted to exercise that power
with restraint. This thinking is unfaithful to the guiding principle
that the courts are a separate institution within our governmental
system. Furthermore, in recent years the Supreme Court has not
exhibited the same desire to limit the discretionary power of the ex-
ecutive (the police). The Court has provided greater leeway to law
enforcement to exercise its discretion. For example, with regard to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the loosening of the probable
cause standard from a rather specific two-pronged test to a more
imprecise "totality of the circumstances" standard is an indication
that the Court has become less concerned with the exercise of law
enforcement discretion.2 26 Thus, discretion is being created in the
name of law enforcement, but there is great reluctance to create it in
the name of individual rights. Possibly the re-emergence of princi-
ples of judicial integrity will act as a check, as our founding ances-
225 See Charles Fried, Impudence, 5 Sup. CT. REv. 55 (1992).
226 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (stating that "where a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggest that the public interest is best
served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 651 (1984) (concluding that the "overriding considerations of public safety justify
the officer's failure to provide Miranda [sic] warnings before he asked questions devoted
to locating an abandoned weapon"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that
the totality of circumstances standard is more flexible and easier to apply).
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tors had envisioned, on the increasing discretionary power of the
police.
If one agrees with Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis that the
courts should be a symbol ofjustice for our society, then one has to
give judges some discretion so that they can act as this symbol. We
are willing to concede that the concept of judicial integrity allows
for a great deal of discretion to be exercised pursuant to relatively
vague concepts. However, this exercise of discretion is limited to
governmental misconduct, an area which the framers entrusted to
the judiciary. In addition, historically, the Court has rarely abused
this discretion.22
7
Furthermore, if we were to follow the approach implied byJus-
tices Thomas and Scalia in Herrera v. Collins228 and not have the
Court intervene (for instance, exercise what we have been calling
judicial integrity) when an innocent man is about to be executed,
could one dare say that this is the role our founding fathers had in
mind for the court system? Surely the courts cannot stand by while
the executive executes an innocent man.229
Somewhere along the way notions of judicial integrity have
been forgotten. These notions have an important role to play and
indeed should become more prominent. The court system should
correct injustices even if those injustices do not necessarily violate
specific laws or rules. Government improprieties should not find an
oasis within the court system.
227 For example, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the defendants were
convicted of murder solely on the basis of their confessions, which were extorted
through such brutal means as whipping and other torture. The Supreme Court held
that using evidence gained in this manner violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 286.
In a subsequent decision, where the petitioners were questioned for seven days culmi-
nating in an all-night examination and denied access to family, friends, or counsel, the
Court held that the extraction of confessions by law enforcement officials in this manner
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 238-41 (1940). "The very circumstances surrounding their confinement
and their questioning without any formal charges having been brought, were such as to
fill petitioners with terror and frightful misgivings." Id. at 239. Similarly, in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951), the defendant was convicted of drug possession based
on evidence which was forcibly gained by law enforcement officials who removed the
evidence from the defendant's stomach with a pump. The Court held that this conduct
violated the Due Process Clause because it shocks the conscience. Id. at 172. Finally, in
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957), the Court held that the petitioner who had
been questioned for several hours, had not been before a magistrate, and was kept in
seclusion from friends, relatives, or counsel was denied due process of law.
228 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
229 1 recognize that this approach might be inconsistent with the finality concerns ex-
pressed by the court when habeas corpus is utilized. See Fried, supra note 226, at 183.
Nevertheless, there has to be some discretion to rectify an egregious fact situation.
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